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Abstract. The potential damage to computer networks keeps increasing due to a growing reliance on the 
Internet and more extensive connectivity. Intrusion detection systems (IDSs) have become an essential 
component of computer security to detect attacks that occur despite the best preventative measures. A problem 
with current intrusion detection systems is that they have many false positive and false negative events. Most 
of the existing Intrusion detection systems implemented nowadays depend on rule-based expert systems where 
new attacks are not detectable. 
In this paper, a possible application of Neural Networks is presented as a component of an intrusion 
detection system. An intrusion detection system called Denial of Service Intelligent Detection (DoSID) is 
developed. The type of Neural Network used to implement DoSID is feed forward which uses the 
backpropagation learning algorithm. The data used in training and testing is the data collected by Lincoln Labs 
at MIT for an intrusion detection system evaluation sponsored by the U.S. Defense Advanced Research 
Projects Agency (DARPA). Special features of connection records have been identified to be used in DoS 
(Denial-of-Service) attacks.  Several experiments have been conducted to test the ability of the neural network 
to distinguish known and unknown attacks from normal traffic.  Results show that normal traffic and know 
attacks are discovered 91% and 100% respectively. Also it has been shown in the final experiment that the 
false negative of the system has been reduced considerably. 
 




1.  Introduction 
 
The potential damage that can be inflicted by attacks launched over the Internet keeps 
increasing due to growing reliance on the Internet and more widespread connectivity. 
Intrusion detection systems (IDSs) have now become an essential component of 
computer security: to detect attacks that occur despite the best preventive measures. 
Some approaches detect attacks in real-time and can be used to monitor and, possibly, 




stop an attack in progress. Others provide after-the-fact forensic information about 
attacks and can help repair damage, understand the attack mechanism, and reduce the 
possibility of future attacks of the same type. More advanced IDSs detect never-before-
seen (new) attacks, while the more typical systems detect previously seen (known) 
attacks. 
 
A set of attempts to compromise a computer or a computer network resource 
security is regarded as an intrusion. In addition, to security services (e.g. data 
confidentiality, integrity, authentication, etc.), intrusion detection (ID) techniques are 
used to strengthen the system security and increase its resistance to internal and external 
attacks. These techniques are implemented through an IDS. Generally, the main task of 
IDS is to detect an intrusion and, if necessary or possible, to undertake some measures to 
eliminate further intrusions. 
 
In this paper, a Denial of Service Intelligent Detection (DoSID) System is 
presented. The system is developed using the feed-forward Neural Network (NN) and 
related improvements such as Gray Area and Distribution to improve the detection 
accuracy of Denial of Service (DoS) attacks.    
 
In the following section, a brief introduction to IDSs and Neural Network 
concepts is given. In section 3, previous works related to IDS using NN have been 
discussed. DoSID framework and related improvements are explained in section 4. 
Finally, results of our experiments are shown in section 5.  
 
 
2. IDS and Neural Network 
 
An IDS is a security system that monitors computer systems and network traffics 
and analyzes that traffic for possible hostile attacks originating from outside the 
organization and also for attacks originating from inside the organization. 
 
There are two general approaches to ID namely: misuse detection and anomaly 
detection. Methods of the first group operate with prior prepared patterns, also called 
signatures, of known attacks that are used to detect intrusions by pattern matching on 
audit information. Methods of the second group deal with profiling user behavior. In 
other words, they define a certain model of a normal user activity. Any deviation from 
this model is regarded as anomalous. DoSID uses the anomaly detection method.  
 
Also IDSs are classified according to the kind of input information they analyze. 
These classes are: “application-based" IDS, "host-based" IDS and "network-based" IDS. 
This classification will be detailed in the coming section. DoSID is a network-based 
IDS. 





2.1 Intrusion detection system hierarchy 
The types of data examined by a particular IDS may vary significantly. IDS can 
be classified into one of the following categories based on the types of data they examine 
[2]: 
y Application-based 
An application-based IDS examines the behaviour of an application program, 
generally in the form of log files. 
y Host-based 
A host-based IDS examines data such as log files, processes accounting 
information, user behaviour, or outputs from application-based IDSs operating 
on the host. This type of system is limited in scope since it is only able to see its 
own host's environment, and cannot detect simultaneous attacks against 
multiple hosts. 
y Network-based 
A network-based IDS examines network traffic. This type of IDS is a dedicated 
computer, or special-purpose hardware, with detection software installed. It is 
placed at a strategic point on a network (like a gateway or sub network) to 
analyze all network traffic on that particular segment. It scans data traffic for 
attacks. Also, it determines Internet Protocol (IP) addresses that originate 
outside its subnet. 
 
2.2 Efficiency of an intrusion detection system 
The following three measures have been used commonly to evaluate the 
efficiency of an IDS [3]: 
y Accuracy 
Accuracy deals with the proper detection of attacks and the absence of false 
alarms. Inaccuracy occurs when an IDS flags a legitimate action in the 
environment as anomalous or intrusive. 
y Performance 
The performance of an IDS is measured by the rate at which audit events are 
processed. If the performance of the IDS is poor, real-time detection is not 
possible.  
y Completeness 
Completeness is the property of an IDS to detect all attacks. Incompleteness 
occurs when the IDS fails to detect an attack. This measure is much more 
difficult to evaluate than the others in real time because, for example, it is 




impossible to have a global knowledge about every single type of attack or 
abuse of privileges. 




2.3 Neural Network Concepts 
A Neural Network is a structure which is composed of a number of simple 
elements or nodes called neurons as shown in Fig. 1. These elements are always 
operating in parallel. The function of the Neural Network is determined largely by the 
connection between the neurons. These neurons are connected by links and each link is 





Fig. 1. Simple neuron. 
 
Neuron showed in Fig. 1 is composed of: input p associated with weight w and 
there is a scalar bias b. The equation n=wp+b forms an input to the second main 
component which is the transfer function. The output of the neuron is the output of the 
transfer function.  
 
The general equation is  
a = f (wp+b) 
 
Here f is a transfer function which takes the argument n and produces the output 
a. The Neural Network will exhibit the desired or interested behavior by adjusting its 
parameters. That means, the Neural Network can be trained to a particular job by 
adjusting the weight or bias parameters or perhaps the network itself will adjust these 
parameter to achieve some desired results.  
 
The input p to the neuron can be expanded to R-elements input and each input is 
multiplied by weight. Their sum is simply (W●P) which is the dot product of the matrix 
W and the vector P. Fig. 2 shows the neuron with the vector input. The argument n 
which is the input to the neuron transfer function will be: 
 
n = w1,1 p1 + w1,2 p2 + w1,3 p3 + … + w1,R p R + b 
A one-layer network with R input vector and S neurons is shown in Fig. 3. 
 






















Fig. 3.  Layer of neurons. 
 
In this Neural Network, each input is connected to each neuron through the 
weight matrix W. 
 




The row indices indicate the destination neuron and the column indices indicate 
the source input. 
 
One of the most commonly used Neural Networks is the multilayer feed-forward 
network. It falls under the category called "Networks for Classification and Prediction". 
The DoSID is built using this specific type of Neural Network. 
 
Feed-forward networks usually consist of two to three layers in which the neurons 
are logically arranged. The last layer is the output layer and there are usually one or 
more hidden layers before the output layer. The DoSID Neural Network as shown in 
Fig.4 is composed of two layers (the hidden and the output layer), a variable number of 
neurons in the hidden layer and there is one neuron in the output layer. Each output 
vector element value is in the range [-1,1]. The transfer functions of neurons on both 
layers are "tan-sigmoid" function. This function takes the input, which may have any 
value between plus and minus infinity, and squashes the output into the range [-1,1]. The 
input vector contains 31 elements. These elements are the result of converting the 18 
features in the DARPA dataset to Neural Network format.  
 
 
Fig. 4. Neural network architecture. 
 
The most common and widely used learning algorithm for multilayer feed 
forward Neural Networks is the backpropagation algorithm. It is based on the Delta Rule 
that basically states that if the difference (delta error) between the user's desired output 
(target) and the network's actual output is to be minimized, the weights must be 
continually modified. The result of the transfer function changes the delta error in the 
output layer. The error in the output layer has been adjusted, and therefore it can be used 
to change the input connection weights so that the desired output may be achieved. This 
is why feed-forward networks are also often called "backpropagation feed-forward 
networks". The learning mechanism is illustrated in Fig. 5.  
 
The input connection weights are adjusted in such a way that the delta error will 
be minimized. This process is repeated several times (Iterations). The training stops if: 
the number of iterations exceeds a certain number of iterations, the training performance 
function drops below certain threshold of MSE, or the training time is longer than certain 
threshold of seconds. The mean squared error (MSE) is computed by "summing the 
squared differences between the target and the network's actual output, and then dividing 
the sum by the number of components (input vector elements) that went into the sum." 












3. Related Research 
 
Since 1995, there are many researches that are based strongly on Neural 
Networks approaches to build various structures of IDS for either anomaly detection or 
misuse detection. Through this section, brief summaries of several researches and 
projects that apply Neural Networks approaches to IDS are given. 
 
One of the recent research projects that focus on Multi Layer Perceptron (MLP) 
and statistical analysis engine is the work done by Jorgenson, Manikopoulos, Li, and 
Zhang [4]. It is a network-based IDS which consists of several tiers, with each tier 
containing Intrusion Detection Agents (IDAs). IDAs are IDS components that monitor 
the activities of a host or a network (See Figure 1). Each IDA consists of: 
 
y Probe 
Collect the network traffic of a host or a network, abstract the traffic into a set 
of statistical variables and generate reports to the event preprocessor. 
y Event preprocessor 
Convert the information into the format required by the statistical processor. 
y Statistical processor 
Compare the data to reference models previously compiled describing the 
normal state of the system. Then, it forms the stimulus vector reports which are 
forwarded to the Neural Network. 
y Neural network 
Analyzes the vector and decides if it is anomalous or normal. 
 




One of the earliest attempts to apply Neural Networks in IDS is the work done by 
Cannady [5].  He used a network-based IDS responsible for monitoring and collecting 
information from the network packets. This information is then forwarded to the MLP 
Neural Network for analysis. The project’s main idea is to make the data go through 
three levels of preprocessing, each level extracting certain features of the packet. Then, 
normalize and group them and convert the result to the Neural Network format in order 
to indicate whether it is an attack. 
 
One of the host-based IDSs produced in 1998 which monitors the applications at 
process level is the result of work done by Charon, Ghosh and Wanken [6]. Their project 
is based on anomaly detection method. The process states and input/output combinations 
were used as input to the MLP Neural Network. A training set was generated using 
simulated normal data input and unknown attacks to the monitored application. 
 
 
5.  Denial of Service Intelligent Detection System Description 
 
The DoSID is described in details in this section.  A feed forward Neural 
Network is used.  Also, the datasets from the 1998 DARPA Intrusion Detection 
Evaluation for training and testing our system are used.   
4.1 Evaluation dataset 
The 1998 DARPA Intrusion Detection Evaluation Program [7] was prepared and 
managed by MIT Lincoln Labs. The objective was to survey and evaluate researches in 
IDSs.  A standard dataset to be audited was provided and called "DARPA dataset". This 
dataset includes a wide variety of intrusions simulated in a military network 
environment. Lincoln Labs set up an environment to acquire nine weeks of raw TCP 
dump data from a local area network (LAN) simulating a typical U.S. Air Force LAN.  
They operated the LAN as if it were a true Air Force environment, but peppered it with 
multiple attacks. 
 
DARPA dataset is separated into two categories. These are: testing dataset and 
training dataset. The raw testing dataset was TCP dump data from two weeks of network 
traffic. This was processed into about two million connection records. These connection 
records are not labeled.  
 
The raw training dataset was about four gigabytes of compressed binary TCP dump 
data from seven weeks of network traffic.  This was processed into about five million 
connection records. Each connection record is labeled as either normal, or as an attack, 
with exactly one specific attack type. In the training dataset there are 22 different attack 
types. 
 




In the training dataset, the attacks fall into four main categories: denial-of-service 
(DoS), unauthorized access from a remote machine (R2L), unauthorized access to local 
super user (root) privileges (U2R), and surveillance and other probing (Probing).In this 
paper, the focus is on DoS attacks. There are six DoS attacks: Back, Land, Neptune, Pod, 
Smurf and Teardrop. 
 
Each record in DARPA training dataset is a connection called connection record. 
Each connection record consists of 41 features and a label. The label indicates either 
normal, or an attack, with exactly one specific attack name. Some of these features are 
immediately getting data from raw TCP dump data, and others required some statistical 
operations to get them. Out of 41 features, 18 features that are useful to detect DoS 
attack are used. So, each connection is filtered to contain only these features.   
 
4.2 DoSID framework 
The DoSID framework as shown in Fig. 7 reflects the sequence of input set 
transformation of connection records. 
 
 
Fig. 2.  DoSID architecture. 
 
 
DoSID is dedicated to DoS attacks. Therefore, the types of connection records 
needed in our experiments are only normal traffic and any DoS attacks. The role of 
"Connection Records Filter" module is to filter the "Input set" to contain only normal 


















"DoS Set", the "Connection Record Filter" module prints in separate set the class of that 
record. It prints either 1 for normal or -1 for DoS attacks in separate line. This set is 
called "Target set".  
 
Each connection record contains 41 features. Only 18 features that are useful for 
detecting DoS attacks are used. "Features Filter" module extracts the needed features (18 
features) from each connection record in "DoS Set" and stores this record in "DoSF Set". 
The "DoSF Set" is converted to Neural Network format to be readable by the Neural 
Network and this is the role of "Neural Network Converter" module. The result of this 
module will be in “NNDoS Set”. The last set is used as input to “Neural Network” 
module. As described in the previous section, this module is a Neural Network 
composed of two layers (the hidden and the output layer), with a variable number of 
neurons in the hidden layer and one neuron in the output layer as depicted in Fig. 4. 
 
Two improvements to DoSID are added by developing and implementing 
different techniques in order to enhance detection accuracy, decision making, and Neural 
Network performance (MSE) for testing phase.    
 
4.3 Improvement 1: gray area  
Neural Network predicts the type of each connection record. Its output is a vector 
that consists of one element which falls in the range [-1, 1]. The connection record is 
classified as normal when the vector value is around 1, where values around -1 indicate a 
DoS attack connection record.  
 
Wherever the output value is closer to 1 or -1, the Neural Network decision 
becomes more accurate. The further the value from 1 and -1 toward 0 indicates non-
accurate decision. Therefore a Gray Area concept is proposed to improve the accuracy of 









Fig. 3.  Gray area concept. 
 
The Gray Area is an area inside the range of the output value. The value that gets 
in this area [x1, x2] is not accurate because it is far from 1 or -1. So, the value is changed 
to zero which means that connection record is unrecognized. 
 
 
-1 X1 0 X2 1 
Gray Area 




The most critical issue in Gray Area concept is its boundaries x1 and x2. The 
values of boundaries are selected based on the desired objective of the gray area. For 
example, in a strict environment where any possible intrusion is to be reported regardless 
of the high false positive warnings, the value of x1 is increased.  
 
The size of Gray Area depends on overall Neural Network results or decisions for 
each connection record in the training set. In order to specify the boundaries of the Gray 
Area, the Distribution concept is introduced.             
 
4.4 Improvement 2: distribution  
In experiment two, the Neural Network gave highly accurate decisions for 
connection records that were used in the training phase. The output value of each 
connection record during the training phase is distributed over the range of output value. 
 
To do this distribution, first, the range is divided into small intervals. The length 
of each interval is 0.1. A counter is assigned for each interval to count the number of 
connection records that the corresponding Neural Network vector output value lies in. 
 
The Gray Area will include each interval that has small counter value. For 
example, in one of the experiments, the distribution of 9979 connection records is as in 
Table 1. So, the range of the Gray Area will be [-0.8, 0.9)   
 
Table 1.  Distribution  training data with 24 neurons and 1000 iterations 
Intervals [-1,-0.9) [-0.9,-0.8) [-0.8,-0.7) [-0.7,-0.6) [-0.6,-0.5) 
Records No. 5974 6 2 0 0 
Intervals [-0.5,-0.4) [-0.4,-0.3) [-0.3,-0.2) [-0.2,-0.1) [-0.1,0) 
Records No. 0 0 0 2 0 
Intervals [0,0.1) [0.1,0.2) [0.2,0.3) [0.3,0.4) [0.4,0.5) 
Records No. 0 0 0 0 0 
Intervals [0.5,0.6) [0.6,0.7) [0.7,0.8) [0.8,0.9) [0.9,1] 




5. Experimental Analysis 
 
In this section, experiments are conducted and their results are presented along 
with the different improvements proposed in the previous section.   
 
5.1 Introduction 
For training and testing the Neural Network, connection records are collected 
randomly from the DARPA training dataset. Therefore, all connection records are 
labeled. They are used in the training phase to inform the Neural Network about the type 




of the connection (attack or normal), so the Neural Network will learn from each 
connection record (i.e. by adjusting its weights).  
 
On the other hand, the labeled connection records are useful in the testing phase 
for measuring the system accuracy. This is done by feeding each connection record to 
the Neural Network. The normal and attack labeled records are fed  separately. By 
computing the average output, the accuracy of the Neural Network decision is obtained. 
 
In order to test the Neural Network against known and unknown attacks, it is trained 
with specific attacks. Some other attacks are left for testing unknown attacks.  The six 
DoS attacks are categorized as follows:    
 
1. Training Attacks 
Four attacks are used for training the Neural Network. These attacks are Back, 
Neptun, Smurf and Teardrop. The labeled connection records using these 
attacks are used to train the Neural Network.  
2. Testing Attacks 
Two training attacks are used for testing the Neural Network. These attacks are 
Back and Smurf, which have been recognized by the Neural Network in the 
training phase. These are called Known Attacks. Also, there are two attacks 
which are not seen by the Neural Network in the training phase. These attacks 
are Land and Pod which are called unknown attacks. 
 
In the following sections, the training performance (MSE) of various Neural 
Networks that have been trained using the training set is shown. Also the results of 
testing the Neural Network that has the best training performance are shown.  
 
5.2 Training experiments  
In the experiments conducted, various Neural Networks are trained using the 
training set. This set contains about 10000 connection records. 4000 connection records 
are labeled with Normal and 6000 connection records are labeled with one of training 
attacks namely Back, Neptun, Smurf or Teardrop.  
 
In the training phase, diverse methods are used to train the Neural Networks in 
order to achieve good performance. Actually, there are many factors affecting the Neural 
Network. Some of the factors that are considered as the most significant factors affecting 
the neural network decision making are: 
 
y Number of neurons per layer 
The Neural Networks is built using one hidden layer that contains 24 or 64 
neurons. 
y Number of iterations (epochs)  




Each Neural Network is trained twice, using 1000 iterations and 5000 
iterations. 
y The initial weights and bias 
The initial weights of each Neural Network training session are selected based 
on the following methods: 
i. Zeros initial: The initial weights are zeros.  
ii. Training initial: The initial weights are the resultant weights from a Neural 
Network that has been trained using 200,000 iterations.  
iii. Random initial: The initial weights are generated randomly. 
        
To show the effects of these factors, the experiments are conducted using all 
combinations. the training performance is measured  using the mean square error (MSE). 
As mentioned before, the MSE is the difference between the target and the Neural 
Network's actual output. So, the best MSE is the closest to 0.  If MSE is 0, this indicates 
Neural Network's output is equal to the target which is the best situation. 
 
5.2.1 experimental results of training phase   
Table 2 shows the training performance (MSE) resulted from training some 
Neural Networks using the training set.  
 
Table 2. The MSE for training sessions using the training set  
 
Neural Network with 24 neuron Neural Network with 64 neuron 
1000 iterations 5000 iterations 1000 iterations 5000 iterations 
Zeros initial 0.0021588 0.0016041 0.0019362 0.0015045 
Training  initial 0.0001617 0.00015721 0.00041351 0.00041306 
Random initial 0.0019256 0.0016443 0.00306 0.00050973 
 
It has been noticed that, the MSE for training using Training Initial Weights is 
better than with Zeros or Random Initial Weights. This is attributed to the fact that the 
training initial weights are generated using 200.000 iterations. 
 
The shaded MSE in table 2 is for a Neural Network with 24 neurons and has been 
trained using 5000 iterations. This Neural Network has the best MSE. This particular 
Neural Network is used in the testing phase. The next section shows the results of the 
testing phase. 
 
5.3 Testing experiments  
To show the accuracy of the Neural Network decisions with each type of 
connection records, connection records are collected randomly from DARPA training 
dataset where these records did not exist in the training set. The connection records are 
divided into three separate sets. Table 3 lists these sets. 
 
Table 3. Testing phase data sets 




Set Name Connection records Possible label(s) 
Normal Set 70 records normal 
Known Set 60 records back, smurf 
Unknown Set 50 records land, pod 
 
  A Neural Network that has one hidden layer which contains 24 neurons is tested. 
This Neural Network has been trained using the training set, training initial weights and 
5000 iterations. The training performance was 0.00015721. 
 
The average output of the Neural Network is used as measurement of the Neural 
Network accuracy. In case of using the Normal set of connection records, the best 
average will be 1. If Known set or Unknown set are used, the best average will be -1.    
 
To show the effect of Gray Area and Distributions improvements, the Neural Network is 
tested two times. One test is conducted without applying the Gray Area and the second is 
done with the application of Gray Area. The next sections show the results. 
 
5.3.1 experimental results for regular testing   
The Neural Network is tested without using the Gray Area concept. The Neural 
Network decision for each connection record must be normal or attack. There are no 
undefined connection records because there is no gray area to indicate uncertainty.  Any 
connection record is considered normal if its output lies in the positive side. If the 
connection record output lies in the negative side, it will be considered an attack as 








    
Fig. 9. The ranges of Attack and Normal decisions without Gray Area. 
 
 
The results of testing the Neural Network using the testing sets are shown in 
Table 4. 
 






False Alarm Connection records Average MSE False 
Positive 
False 
Negative DoS Normal 
Normal 
(70) 91.42% 8.57%  6 64 0.835604 0.3103 
 










(60) 100%  0% 60 0 -0.9936 7.47E-05 
Unknown 
(50) 60%  40% 30 20 -0.38181 0.91189 
 
As shown in Table 4, the neural network correctly detected 100% of the known 
attacks. Testing the normal traffic, the false positive indicator is low which is less than 
9%.  It has been noticed that the Neural Network can detect 60% of the attacks that it did 
not see in the training phase, which proves that the Neural Network can detect new 
attacks, but the false negative indicator is still high. 
 
5.3.2 experimental results for testing with gray area 
To see the effect of Gray Area, the Neural Network is tested again using the same 
testing sets that are used in the previous tests but using the Gray Area. The Distribution 
is used to determine the boundaries of gray area. Table 5 shows the distribution of 
simulation of the training set using the Neural Network under testing. 
 
Table 5. The distribution of simulation of the training set 
Intervals [-1,-0.9) [-0.9,-0.8) [-0.8,-0.7) [-0.7,-0.6) [-0.6,-0.5) 
Records No. 5975 4 0 0 0 
Intervals [-0.5,-0.4) [-0.4,-0.3) [-0.3,-0.2) [-0.2,-0.1) [-0.1,0) 
Records No. 0 0 0 0 0 
Intervals [0,0.1) [0.1,0.2) [0.2,0.3) [0.3,0.4) [0.4,0.5) 
Records No. 1 0 0 0 0 
Intervals [0.5,0.6) [0.6,0.7) [0.7,0.8) [0.8,0.9) [0.9,1] 
Records No. 0 0 0 2 3997 
 
From table 5, the density of records exists in intervals: [-1,0.8) which means that 
5979 records are attacks, and [0.8,1] which means that 3999 records are normal. From 
this distribution, the range of the gray area is [-0.8,0.8).  The connection records lying in 
this range as “Unrecognized” records are considered. The connection records lying in the 
positive side are “Normal” and in the negative side are “Attack”. (See Fig. 10) 








Fig. 6. The ranges of attack, normal and unrecognized decisions with gray area. 
 
Table 6 shows the result of testing the Neural Network using the Gray Area and testing 
sets.  
 
Table 6.  Results for testing a neural network with 64 neurons and 5000 iterations with gray area 
 














False Alarm Connection records 
Average MSE False Positiv
e 
False 
Negative DoS Normal 
Unreco
gnized 
Normal (70) 91.42% 5.71%  4 64 2 0.845042 0.285189 
Known (60) 100%  0% 60 0 0 -0.9936 7.47E-05 
Unknown 
(50) 58%  8% 29 4 17 -0.5074 0.608 
 




By applying the Gray Area concept, there is considerable improvement in the 
results in two aspects. First, it minimizes the false negative indicator from 40% to 8%. 
Second, it shows the high level of accuracy of the Neural Network's decision where most 
of the output fell very close to 1 in case of Normal connection records and very close to -





The Neural Networks provide a number of advantages in the detection of new 
attacks. In this paper, the DoSID system as a network-based IDS is introduced using 
Neural Network to detect Denial of Service attacks. The training dataset from DARPA  
is used to train and test our Neural Network.   
 
The ability of a feed-forward Neural Network is tested to classify normal traffic 
correctly and to detect attacks.  It has been found that the Neural Network detects the 
known attacks which have been used in the training of the Neural Network. Also, it has 
been found that the Neural Network can detect unknown attacks which have never been 
used in the training phase. These results mean that the Neural Networks are a significant 
technique to detect new attacks. 
  
The Gray Area improvement is proposed which uses the distribution concept to 
determine the boundaries of Gray Area. The experiment using the gray area resulted in 
improving the false negative indicator from 40% to only 8%, and it increased the 
accuracy of Neural Network decisions. 
 
In the experiments, various Neural Networks are trained using different 
combinations of factors. Also it has been found that the training using initial weights 
resulting from a previous training has the best training performance (MSE). The Neural 
Network that has the best MSE is tested using three data sets, namely, Normal data set, 
Known data set, and Unknown data set. It has been shown that the Neural Network can 
detect the unknown attacks. These attacks are not seen by the Neural Network in the 
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 اﻟﻌﺼﺒﻴﺔ اﻻﻛﺘﺸﺎف اﻟﺬﻛﻲ ﻟﻬﺠﻤﺎت ﺗﻌﻄﻴﻞ اﻟﺨﺪﻣﺔ ﺑﺈﺳﺘﺨﺪام اﻟﺸﺒﻜﺔ
 
 د. ﻋﺒﺪاﻟﻘﺎدر ﺑﻦ ﻋﺒﺪاﷲ اﻟﻔﻨﺘﻮخ
 ﻗﺴﻢ ﻋﻠﻮم ﺣﺎﺳﺐ، ﻛﻠﻴﺔ ﻋﻠﻮم اﳊﺎﺳﺐ واﳌﻌﻠﻮﻣﺎت، ﺟﺎﻣﻌﺔ اﳌﻠﻚ ﺳﻌﻮد




 م(٥٠٠٢/٧٠/٤٠ﰲ  م؛ وﻗﺒﻞ ﻟﻠﻨﺸﺮ٤٠٠٢/٨٠/٥١)ﻗّﺪم ﻟﻠﻨﺸﺮ ﰲ 
 
اﻷﺧﲑة ازدادت ﺣﻮادث اﻻﻋﺘﺪاء ﻋﻠﻰ اﻟﺸﺒﻜﺎت  ﺔﰲ اﻵوﻧ  ﻣﻠﺨﺺ اﻟﺒﺤﺚ. ﻣﻠﺨﺺ اﻟﺒﺤﺚ.
وﺗﻌﻄﻴﻠﻬﺎ وذﻟﻚ ﻋﺎﺋﺪ ﻟﺰﻳﺎدة اﻻﻋﺘﻤﺎدﻳﺔ ﻋﻠﻴﻬﺎ واﻟﺮﻏﺒﺔ ﰲ اﻟﱰاﺑﻂ ﻣﻊ اﻟﺸﺒﻜﺎت اﻷﺧﺮى وﺷﺒﻜﺔ 
ﻟﻨﻈﺮ ﻋﻦ ﻗﻮة اﻹﻧﱰﻧﺖ. ﻟﻘﺪ أﺻﺒﺤﺖ أﻧﻈﻤﺔ اﻛﺘﺸﺎف اﻻﺧﱰاق ﻋﻨﺼﺮ رﺋﻴﺲ ﰲ ﻣﻨﻈﻮﻣﺔ اﳊﻤﺎﻳﺔ ﺑﻐﺾ ا
اﳊﻤﺎﻳﺔ واﻟﺪﻓﺎﻋﺎت اﳋﺎرﺟﻴﺔ. وﻛﻤﺎ ﻫﻮ ﻣﻌﺮوف ﻓﺈن ﻣﻌﻈﻢ أﻧﻈﻤﺔ ﻛﺸﻒ اﻻﺧﱰاق ﻟﻸﺟﻬﺰة واﻟﺸﺒﻜﺎت 
ﺗﻌﺘﻤﺪ ﻋﻠﻰ أﻧﻈﻤﺔ اﳋﱪة اﻟﱵ ﲢﺘﻮي ﻋﻠﻰ ﻗﻮاﻋﺪ ﳏﺪدة ﻻ ﺗﺴﺘﻄﻴﻊ اﻛﺘﺸﺎف اﳍﺠﻤﺎت اﳉﺪﻳﺪة. ﺑﻞ إĔﺎ 
đﺠﻤﺎت، ﺑﺎﻹﺿﺎﻓﺔ إﱃ ﺗﺘﺴﻢ ﰲ اﻟﻐﺎﻟﺐ ﰲ اﻟﺘﺴﺒﺐ ﰲ إﺻﺪار ﻧﺴﺒﺔ ﻛﺒﲑة ﻣﻦ اﻟﺒﻼﻏﺎت اﻟﻜﺎذﺑﺔ 
 إﺧﻔﺎﻗﻬﺎ ﰲ اﻛﺘﺸﺎف ﺑﻌﺾ اﳍﺠﻤﺎت.
ﰲ ﻫﺬا اﻟﺒﺤﺚ ﰎ ﺗﻘﺪﱘ ﺗﻄﺒﻴﻖ اﻟﺸﺒﻜﺔ اﻟﻌﺼﺒﻴﺔ ﻛﺄﺣﺪ ﻣﻜﻮﻧﺎت ﻧﻈﺎم ﻛﺸﻒ اﻻﺧﱰاﻗﺎت 
اﻟﺸﺒﻜﻴﺔ وﺑﺎﻟﺘﺤﺪﻳﺪ ﻟﻜﺸﻒ ﻫﺠﻤﺎت ﺗﻌﻄﻴﻞ اﳋﺪﻣﺔ. ﻟﻘﺪ ﰎ ﺑﻨﺎء ﻧﻈﺎم ﺷﺒﻜﺔ ﻋﺼﺒﻴﺔ ﻟﻜﺸﻒ 
 kcaB"ﻮارزﻣﻴﺔ اﻻﻧﺘﺸﺎر اﻟﻌﻜﺴﻲ ﺧاﻻﺧﱰاﻗﺎت اﳌﻌﺮوﻓﺔ وﻏﲑ اﳌﻌﺮوﻓﺔ، وﻟﻘﺪ ﰎ اﺳﺘﺨﺪام  
اﻟﱵ ﺗﺴﺘﺨﺪم ﰲ ﺗﺪرﻳﺐ اﻟﺸﺒﻜﺎت اﻟﻌﺼﺒﻴﺔ ﻛﺎﻣﻠﺔ اﻻرﺗﺒﺎط وذات "  mhtiroglA noitagaporP
. ﰲ ﻣﺮﺣﻠﺔ ﺗﺪرﻳﺐ اﻟﺸﺒﻜﺔ ﻋﻠﻰ اﻻﺧﱰاﻗﺎت وﻣﺘﻌﺪدة اﻟﻄﺒﻘﺎت ”drawroF deeF“ اﻟﺘﻐﺬﻳﺔ اﻷﻣﺎﻣﻴﺔ




ﰲ اﳌﺸﺮوع اﻟﺬي ﰎ  ﺲ ﻟﻠﺘﻘﻨﻴﺔﻣﻌﻬﺪ ﻣﺎﺳﺎﺷﻮﺳﺘﰎ اﺳﺘﺨﺪام اﻟﺒﻴﺎﻧﺎت اﻟﱵ ﻗﺪﻣﻬﺎ ﻣﻌﻤﻞ ﻟﻴﻨﻜﻠﻦ ﰲ 
 رﻋﺎﻳﺘﻪ ﻋﻦ ﻃﺮﻳﻖ وﻛﺎﻟﺔ دارﺑﺎ اﻟﺘﺎﺑﻌﺔ ﻟﻮزارة اﻟﺪﻓﺎع اﻷﻣﺮﻳﻜﻴﺔ. 
أﺛﺒﺘﺖ اﻟﺘﺠﺎرب اﻟﱵ أﺟﺮﻳﺖ ﻋﻠﻰ اﻟﺸﺒﻜﺔ اﻟﻌﺼﺒﻴﺔ أĔﺎ ﻗﺎدرة وﺑﻨﺴﺒﺔ ﻛﺒﲑة ﻋﻠﻰ اﻟﺘﻤﻴﻴﺰ ﺑﲔ 
ﺖ اﻟﺸﺒﻜﺔ اﻻﺗﺼﺎﻻت اﻻﻋﺘﻴﺎدﻳﺔ واﳍﺠﻤﺎت. ﻛﻤﺎ ﰎ ﲢﺴﲔ اﻟﺸﺒﻜﺔ اﻟﻌﺼﺒﻴﺔ ﻟﺘﻜﻮن أﻛﺜﺮ دﻗﺔ. ﻟﻘﺪ ﻗﺎﻣ
% ﻣﻦ اﳍﺠﻤﺎت ﻏﲑ اﳌﻌﺮوﻓﺔ ﻣﺴﺒﻘﺎ. وﺑﺘﻘﺪﱘ ﻣﻔﻬﻮم اﳌﻨﻄﻘﺔ اﻟﺮﻣﺎدﻳﺔ ٠٦اﻟﻌﺼﺒﻴﺔ ﺑﺎﻛﺘﺸﺎف ﻣﺎ ﻧﺴﺒﺘﻪ 
% إﱃ ٠٤اﻋﺘﻴﺎدﻳﺔ ﻣﻦ  تﰎ إﺛﺒﺎت أﻧﻪ ﺑﺎﻹﻣﻜﺎن ﺗﻘﻠﻴﻞ ﻧﺴﺒﺔ اﻋﺘﺒﺎر ﺑﺄن ﺑﻌﺾ اﳍﺠﻤﺎت ﻫﻲ اﺗﺼﺎﻻ
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